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1 .  Introduction 
Christopher Kennedy 
University of California, Santa Cruz 
The focu s  of this paper is a phenomenon that I wi l l  refer to as "cross-polar 
anomaly" , which is exemplified by the sentences in  ( 1 )-(5) . 1  
( 1 )  #Mike i s  shorter than Carmen i s  tal l .  
(2) #The Brothers Karamazov i s  longer than The Idiot i s  short .  
(3 )  #The ficus i s  taller than the ceiling is low. 
(4) #The Tenderloin is dirtier than Pacific Heights is clean . 
(5)  #A Volvo i s  safer than a Fiat is  dangerous .  
These sentences present an i nteresting puzzle for a theory of adjectival polarity and 
the semantics of the gradable adjectives,  because they show that comparatives 
formed out of positive and negative pairs of adjectives are semantically anomalous .  
Cruc ial ly ,  ( 1 ) - (5)  clearly contrast with examples of comparative subdeletion i n  
which both adjectives have the same polarity, such as (6) and (7) .  
(6) The space telescope is longer than it is wide. 
(7) The ficus is shorter than the doorway i s  low, so it should fit in the room.  
My goal  in th i s  paper i s  to use cross-polar anomaly as  an empirical bas i s  for 
motivat ing and developing a particular approach to the semantics of gradable 
adjectives and the representation of adjectival polarity .  Specifically, I will argue 
that gradable adjectives denote relations between individuals and extents, or 
intervals on a scale, as in  the work of Seuren 1 978 ,  1 984, von Stechow 1 984b, and 
Lobner 1 990, rather than relations between individuals and degrees, or points on a 
scale, as traditionally assumed. I will further claim that adjectival polarity should be 
characterized as a sortal distinction between positive and negative adjectives, I show 
that this approach supports an explanation of cross-polar anomaly as a type of sortal 
anomaly .  
2. Degrees and Polar Opposition 
Cresswell ( 1 976: 266) suggests that " [w]hen we make comparisons we have i n  
mind points o n  a scale" .  Building on this intuition, Cresswell develops a semantic 
analysis of gradable adjectives as expressions that define mappings between objects 
and such points, or "degrees" .  Intuitively ,  a scale is an abstract representation of 
measurement: an infinitely long measuring stick, which provides a representation 
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of the amount to which an object possesses some grad able property .  More 
formally, a scale can be defined as a dense, l inearly ordered set of points, where the 
ordering is relativized to a dimension, which corresponds to a gradable property 
such as height, length, speed , density, beauty, etc . ,  and a degree can be defined as 
an element of a scale.2 
Once scales and degrees are i ntroduced into the ontology, gradable 
adjectives can be analyzed as relational expressions ;  specifically, as expressions that 
relate objects in their domains to degrees on a scale (see e .g .  Cresswell 1 976, 
Hel lan 1 98 1 ,  Hoeksema 1 983 ,  von Stechow 1 984a, Heim 1 985 ,  B ierwisch 1 989, 
Lerner and Pinkal 1 992, 1 995,  Moltmann 1 992, Rullmann 1 995 ,  Gawron 1 995 
and others) .3 The logical representation of a sentence of the form x is  q>, where q> is 
a grad able adjective, i s  as shown in  (8) .  (8)  has the truth conditions i n  (9), where 
dIP is a function that maps objects in the domain of q> to the scale associated with q>. 
(8)  q>(x,d) 
(9) I Iq>(x,d) I I  = 1 iff drp(x) � d 
Informally, x is q> is true just in case the projection of x on the scale associated with 
q> ( i .e . ,  the degree to which x is q» is at least as great as some degree d. In the case 
of a typical absolute construction, such as ( 1 0) ,  the value of d i s  a contextually 
determined " standard" (cf. Bartsch and Vennemann 1 973 ,  Cresswell 1 976, von 
S techow 1 984a, B ierwisch 1 989, Gawron 1 995) . 4 For example ,  the logical 
representation of a sentence l ike ( 1 0) is ( 1 1 ) , where ds(long) denotes a contextually 
determined standard of " longness " .  
( 1 0) The Brothers Karamazov is long. 
( 1 1 )  10ng(BK, ds(/ong) 
Given the truth conditions i n  (9) ,  ( 1 0) is true if and only if d/ollg (BK) � ds(long) 
holds, i . e . ,  j ust in case the projection of The Brothers Karamazov on a scale of 
length is at least as great as the standard of longness in the context of utterance. 
Absolute constructions with negative adjectives can be analyzed in basically 
the same way, with one important modification : the relation between the reference 
value and the standard value must be reversed (see Bierwisch 1 989,  Gawron 1 995 
for discussion) .  This point is i l lustrated by the analysis of ( 1 2) .  
( 1 2) The Dream of a Ridiculous Man is short . 
( 1 3) short(Dream,ds(short» 
The logical representation of ( 1 2) is ( 1 3) ,  where ds(short) denotes an appropriate 
standard of " shortness" (which may or may not be the same as the standard of 
longness in a given context ;  see Klein 1 980). The crucial difference between ( 1 2) 
and ( 1 0) is that in the former, the partial ordering relation associated with the 
absolute construction must be reversed: ( 1 2) is true just in case the degree to which 
The Dream of a Ridiculous Man is short is  ordered below the standard value on a 
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scale of length. To see that this is  so, consider a context in which the standard of 
longness for Russian novels is  600 pages, and the standard of shortness  is 400 
pages .  In this context, any novel over 600 pages in length counts as long, while 
any novel under  400 pages in length counts as short (a  novel whose length is 
between 400 and 600 pages is neither long nor short ;  in Klein 's  ( 1 980) 
terminology, it falls in the "extension gap" on the scale of length). 
The analysis of the absolute constructions outlined here can be used as the 
basis for an analysis of comparatives as expressions that introduce existential 
quantification over degrees (see e .g . ,  Hellan 1 98 1 ,  von Stechow 1 984a,b, Heim 
1 985,  Lerner & Pinkal 1 992, 1 995,  Gawron 1 995, Hazout 1 995, Rullmann 1 995) .  
For example, in Heim 1 985 ,  comparatives are analyzed as indefinite degree 
descriptions, which restrict the possible values of the degree argument of a gradable 
predicate .5  On this view, the logical representation of a typical comparative l ike 
( 1 4) is as shown in ( 1 5) ,  where de is the degree introduced by the comparative 
clause (the complement of than or as) .6 
( 14) x is more cp than de 
( 1 5) 3d[d > de] [cp(x,d)] 
Given the truth conditions for the absolute construction in (9) above, x is more cp 
than de is true just in case there is a degree d such that d exceeds de and x is at least 
as cp as d. Equatives and less comparatives are interpreted in the same way, modulo 
the different ordering relations introduced by as and less (� and <, respectively) . 
For illustration of the basic proposal , consider the analysis of ( 1 6) ,  which 
has the logical representation in ( 1 7) .  
( 1 6) The Brothers Karamazov is longer than The Idiot is .  
( 1 7) 3d[d > td '. long(ldiot,d ,) ] [ long(BK, d)] 
( 1 6) is true iff there is a degree such that d exceeds the (maximal) degree to which 
The Idiot is long, and The Brothers K. is at least as long as d. In a context such as 
( 1 8) ,  then, where d/ denotes the degree of The Idiot 's length and dBK denotes the 
degree of The Brothers Karamazov's length, ( 1 6) is true. 
( 1 8) LENGTH : 0 ------ d/ ----- dBK ------- oo 
Comparatives with negative adjectives can be analyzed in essentially the 
same way, with one exception : as was the case with negative absolute 
constructions, the ordering relation associated with the comparative must be 
reversed .  This i s  i l lustrated by a sentence like ( 1 9) ,  which has the logical 
representation in (20) . 
( 1 9) The Idiot is shorter than The Brothers Karamazov is .  
(20) 3d[d < td'.short(BK,d') ] [short(ldiot,d) ] 
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( 1 9) is  true just in case for some degree d which is exceeded by the degree to which 
The Brothers Karamazov is  short, The Idiot is d-short. It follows that this sentence 
i s  also true in the context illustrated in ( 1 8) ,  which is the correct result. 
The relational difference between positive and negative adjectives illustrated 
by the absolute and comparative constructions discussed here suggests an intuitive 
approach to the representation of adjectival polarity within a degree algebra. 
Specifically, we can make the natural assumption that antonymous adjectives such 
as long and short map objects in their domain to the same points on a shared 
scale-in the case of long and short, a scale along a dimension of length-but they are 
distinguished by having opposite ordering relations imposed on the degrees (cf. 
Rullmann 1 995, Kennedy 1 997) .  In other words, the sets of positive and negative 
degrees on any scale are isomorphic, but they stand in the dual relation to each 
other. This assumption has a very positive result: if for any object, its degrees of 
e.g. longness and shortness are the same, then sentences l ike ( 1 6) and ( 1 9) are 
logically equivalent .  As a result, (2 1 )  is correctly predicted to be valid. 
(2 1 )  The Brothers Karamazov i s  longer than The Idiot i f  and only i f  The Idiot is 
shorter than The Brothers Karamazov. 
3. The Problem of Cross-Polar A nomaly 
In its most general sense, the puzzle presented by sentences like ( 1  ) - (5 )  for the 
analysis of gradable adjectives and adjectival polarity outlined in section 2 is that the 
very same assumptions which lead to a straightforward explanation of the validity 
of (2 1 )  make the wrong predictions in the case of cross-polar anomaly .  Consider 
(2) again, repeated below. 
(2) #The Brothers Karamazov is longer than The Idiot is short . 
(22) 3d[d > td' .short(ldiot,d ') ] [long(BK,d) ] 
( 1 )  has the logical representation shown in (22) :  it 's true just in case for some 
degree d which exceeds the (maximal) degree to which The Idiot i s  short, The 
Brothers Karamazov is at least as long as d. S ince the degree of an object ' s  
shortness i s  identical to its degree of longness, th is  sentence should be true 
whenever the projection of The Brothers Karamazov on a scale of length exceeds 
the projection of The Idiot on a scale of length. In the context illustrated above in 
( 1 8) ,  then, (2) should be true. In other words, (2) should not only be perfectly 
interpretable, it should be logically equivalent to ( 1 6) and ( 1 9) .  Crucial ly .  this 
result is not specific to long and short: it is inevitable given the formalization of 
degrees as points on a scale and the assumption that positive and negative degrees 
are the same objects, an assumption that is necessary to explain the val idity of  (2 1 ) . 
Note that this result is not a consequence of the assumption that the 
comparative clause denotes a definite description of a (maximal) degree. The same 
problem arises if the comparative clause is analyzed as a universal quantification 
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structure (as in e .g . ,  Atlas 1 984, Lerner & Pinkal 1 992, 1 995 ,  Gawron 1 995 ,  
Moltmann 1 992, Gawron 1 995), although such an  analysis appears a t  first glance 
to provide an explanation of cross-polar anomaly .  If the comparative clause 
involves universal quantification, the logical form of (2) is (23). 
(23) 3d[Vd,[short(Idiot,d ,) � d >  dl] [long(BK, d) ]  
Given the earlier claim that the truth conditions of the absolute are defined in terms 
of a partial ordering relation (i .e . ,  that cp(x,d) is true iff x is at least as cp as d), (2) 
is  true j ust in case for some degree d that exceeds every degree d '  such that The 
Idiot is at least as short as d', The Brothers K is at least as long as d. Assuming 
that a scale has no maximal element (see von Stechow 1 984a,b, Rullmann 1 995) ,  
however, there is no degree that satisfies the conditions imposed by the restriction, 
because the set of degrees introduced by the comparative clause includes every 
degree ordered above the projection of The Idiot on a scale of length. The result is 
that sentences like (2) are predicted to be contradictory. 
Even if we are willing to explain cross-polar anomaly in terms of  
contradiction, however, there is evidence that this analysis cannot be maintained. 
Comparatives with less show that if the comparative clause involves universal 
quantification over degrees, then the truth conditions of the absolute cannot be 
defined in terms of a partial ordering relation (see Rullmann 1 995) .  Consider, for 
example, the analysis of (24). 
(24) The Devils is  less acclaimed than The Brothers Karamazov is. 
(25)  3d[Vd,[acc/aimed(BK,d,) � d < dl ] [acc/aimed(Devils,d)] 
If the set of degrees introduced by the comparative clause includes every degree that 
is at least as great as the degree to which The Brothers Karamazov is acclaimed, 
then there is no degree that satisfies the restriction, incorrectly predicting that (24) 
should be contradictory. In order to resolve this problem, the truth conditions of 
the absolute must be defined in terms of equality : qJ(x,d) is true iff x is  exactly ascp 
a s  d) . The positive consequence o f  this move i s  that the set o f  degrees introduced 
by the comparative clause in (25) contains a single member-the degree to which 
The Brothers Karamazov is acclaimed-permitting an accurate analysis of the truth 
conditions of comparatives with less. The negative consequence is that the set of 
degrees introduced by the comparative clause in (23) ,  also contains a single 
member-the degree to which The Idiot is short-with the result that (2)  (as well as 
other examples of cross-polar anomaly) is no longer predicted to be contradictory .  
A more promising response to  the puzzle of  cross-polar anomaly would be 
to reject the claim that positive and negative degrees are comparable in the way that I 
have assumed, arguing instead that cross-polar anomaly i s  an instance of 
incommensurability, a type of anomaly observed in comparatives constructed out of 
incomparable adjectives, such as (26)-(27) (see Klein 1 99 1  for discussion) .  
(26) #Carmen is taller than Mike is intelligent. 
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(27) #The Idiot is more tragic than my copy of The Brothers K is  heavy. 
The formalization of scales and degrees outlined in section 2 provides the 
basis for an explanation of incommensurability as a kind of sortal anomaly. Scales 
are associated with a dimensional parameter, which differentiates one scale from 
another, and has the consequence that degrees on different scales are elements of 
different ordered sets .  Since the ordering relation introduced by the comparative is 
defined only for elements of the same ordered set,  in an example like (27), which 
has the logical representation in (28) ,  only degrees of heaviness satisfy the 
restriction imposed by the comparative. 
(28) 3d[d > ld'.heavy(my copy of the Brothers K,d,)] [tragic(ldiot,d)] 
As a result, the degree argument of tragic is constrained to be a degree of heaviness. 
Degrees on scales associated with different dimensional parameters are distinct 
objects, however, so the comparative restricts the degree argument of tragic to be a 
degree of the wrong sort, triggering a sortal anomaly .7 
This explanation could be extended to cross-polar anomaly in the following 
way .  Like degrees of e .g .  tragicness and heaviness, positive and negative degrees 
on the same scale are different sorts of obj ects, and sentences like ( 1 )-(5) are 
anomalous for the same reason as (26)-(27) :  the comparative restricts the degree 
argument of the adjective to be a degree of the wrong sort. This explanation builds 
on the intuition that although positive and negative adjectives share the same scale 
(an assumption that is necessary to account for the validity of e .g .  (2 1 » , they 
provide different perspectives on the projection of an object onto the scale. As a 
result, positive and negative degrees should be treated as different sorts of obj ects . 
Although I will ultimately argue that the basic form of this explanation of 
cross-polar anomaly is the right one, this analysis is unavailable in a degree algebra 
for two reasons. First, typical examples of comparative subdeletion such as (6)-(7) 
show that whenever a mapping between degrees on different scales can be defined, 
comparison is possible . Given the analysis of adjectival polarity outlined in section 
2, such a mapping between positive and negative degrees is always available (the 
identity function) ,  therefore examples of cross-polar anomaly should be 
interpretable . Second, and more problematic,  if positive and negative degrees are 
the same objects, then they simply can't be sortally distinguished (in the way that 
degrees of tragic ness and heaviness can be) without resorting to ad hoc stipulations . 
4. Extents and Polar Opposition 
As noted above, the intuition underlying an explanation of cross-polar anomaly in 
terms of incommensurability is that although antonymous pairs of adjectives 
provide the same kind of information about an object-both tall and short are used to 
characterize an object's height-they nevertheless represent different perspectives on 
the projection of an object on a scale, and this difference in perspective should be 
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formalized in terms of a sortal distinction between positive and negative degrees .  
The  problem for a degree algebra is that such a distinction must be  stipulated, i t  
does not follow from the underlying architecture of  the theory of  adjectival polarity. 
In order to construct a theory of polarity that does have this property,  I will 
adopt an alternative ontology of "degrees " ,  in which the projection of an object on a 
scale is represented not as a discrete point, but rather as an interval , or extent ( see 
Seuren 1 978 ,  1 984, von Stechow 1 984b, and Lobner 1 990) .8 This idea c an be 
formalized as follows. As in the degree approach, a scale can be defined as a 
dense, linearly ordered set of points possibly with a minimal element but with no 
maximal element, where the ordering is relative to some dimension.9 An extent can 
then be defined as a convex, proper subset of a scale . Finally, assuming a function 
d which maps an object in the domain of a gradable adjective to a point on the scale 
(this is the same sort of function that was adopted earlier to map objects to degrees),  
I will make a further distinction between two sorts of extents which, following von 
S techow 1 984b, I will refer to as positive and negative extents. Positive and 
negative extents are defined in (29) and (30) . 
(29) The positive extent of a on a scale So (poso(a)) = (p E So l p :::; do(a) } 
(30) The negative extent of a on a scale So (NEGo(a)) = {p E So l do(a) ::;; p }  
Roughly speaking, a positive extent i s  an extent which ranges from the 
lower end of a scale to a some point, and a negative extent is an extent which ranges 
from some point to the upper end of the scale. The basic idea is illustrated by (3 1 ) ,  
which shows the positive and negative projections o f  an object a o n  a scale So. 
(3 1 )  So: o --- POso(a) --- ----- NEGo(a) ---�) 00 
The intuition that this distinction between positive and negative extents is designed 
to capture is exactly the one I discussed above : that the members of an antonymous 
pair of adjectives provide different-in fact complementary-perspectives on the 
projection of an object onto the scale . The structural distinction between positive 
and negative extents provides a means of explicitly encoding this difference into a 
theory of adjectival polarity . Because positive and negative extents are distinct 
objects, the set of positive extents on a scale S and the set of negative extents on S 
are disjoint subsets of the entire set of extents on S. As a result, the set of gradable 
adjectives can be sorted in the following way :  positive adjectives denote relations 
between individuals and positive extents ;  negative adjectives denote relations 
between individuals and negative extents . On this view, adjectival polarity is  
characterized as a sortal distinction between positive and negative adjectives .  
This approach to adjectival polarity has an important empirical consequence: 
it allows the interpretation of absolute and comparative constructions to be defined 
in terms of a single ordering relation. 10 Since extents are defined set-theoretically, 
the truth conditions for both positive and negative adjectives in the absolute form 
can be stated in terms of set-inclusion, as in (32) ,  where <I> is a function from 
individuals to positive or negative extents (determined by the polarity of <pl . 
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(32)  l Icp(x. e) 1 I  = 1 iff <l>(x) :2 e 
For illustration, consider the analysis of (33)  and (34) in the context illustrated by 
(35) ,  where LONG(BK) denotes the positive extent of The Brothers Karamazov on 
the scale of length, sHoRT(BK) denotes its negative extent, and es( /ong) and es(short) 
denote appropriate standards of longness and shortness, respectively .  
According to the truth conditions for the absolute in (32) ,  (33)  is true just  in case 
the extent to which The Brothers Karamazov is long includes the standard value. It 
follows that (33) is true in (35) ,  because LONG(BK) :2 es(long) holds.  
The negative absolute constructions in (34) is analyzed in exactly the same 
way. (34) is  true just in case the extent to which The Brothers Karamazov is  short 
includes the standard of shortness;  in the context illustrated by (35) ,  (34) is  false , 
because sHoRT(BK) :2 es(short) does not hold. The same ordering rel ation is used to 
calculate the truth of both the positive and negative absolute constructions;  this was 
not the case in the algebra of degrees discussed in section 2 ,  in which the ordering 
relation associated with the absolute had to be reversed for negative adjectives .  
The analysis of positive and negative comparatives is similar. To keep the 
comparison as simple and direct as possible, I will adopt the same kind of semantic 
analysis of comparatives that I used when describing the degree approach :  
comparatives involve restricted existential quantification over extents, and the 
comparative clause is a definite description of an extent. Given this assumption, the 
interpretation of the comparative construction can be stated in terms of proper 
inclusion : a sentence of the form x is more £P than de has the interpretation in (36). 
(36) 3e[e ::> eel [ cp(x. e) ]  
For illustration, consider the analysis of (37)  and (38) in the context represented by 
(39), where LONG(BK) and sHoRT(BK) are as defined above, and LONG(/diot) and 
SHORT(/diot) represent the positive and negative extents of The Idiot's length. 
(37)  The Brothers Karamazov is longer than The Idiot i s .  
(38)  The Idiot is  shorter than The Brothers Karamazov i s .  
(39)  LENGTH: a -------------------�) 00 
0 ---- LONG(BK) ----- '0 - SHORT(BK) ) 00 
a LONG (Idiot) --- 0 SHORT(ldiot) ----) 00 
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The logical representation of (37) is (40) : this sentence is true just in case for some 
extent e such that e properly includes the positive projection of The Idiot on a scale 
of length, The Brothers Karamazov is at least as long as e. 
(40) 3e[e ::::> te ' .long(ldiot,e ,) ] [long(BK, e) ]  
S ince these conditions are met i n  the context shown i n  (39), (37) is true. 
The negative comparative (38) is treated in the same way ,  and like (37), it is 
true in (39).  The logical representation of (38) is (4 1 ) , which states that (38) i s  
true just in  c ase for some extent e such that e properly includes the  negative 
projection of The Brothers K on a scale of length, The Idiot is  at least as short as e. 
(4 1 )  3e [e ::::> u '.short(BK,e ') ] [short(ldiot, e)]  
Note that as was the case with the negative absolute , there is no need to assume a 
change in the ordering relation associated with the comparative : the structure of 
extents is  such that the same ordering relation can be used to characterize the truth 
conditions of both positive and negative comparatives. 
(37) and (38) can be used to illustrate another important aspect of the 
analysis, namely that it explains the validity of constructions like (42) . 
(42) The Idiot i s  shorter than The Brothers Karamazov i ff The Brothers 
Karamazov is longer than The Idiot. 
A sentence like (42) can be paraphrased in the following way: " the extent to which 
The Idiot i s  short exceeds the extent to which The Brothers Karamazov is  short if 
and only i f  the extent to which The Brothers Karamazov is long exceeds the extent 
to which The Idiot is long" .  More generally, statements like (42) can be viewed as 
substitution i nstances of (43) ,  where POS 8 and NEG8 are antonymous gradable 
adjectives whose ranges are extents on a scale associated with a dimension o. 
(43) POs8Ca) ::::> POslf..b) iff NEGlf..b) ::::> NEGlf..a) 
The validity of (43) follows from the fact that positive and negative extents 
represent (j oin) complementary projections of an object on a scale. Given the 
definitions in  (29) and (30), the complements of positive and negative extents are: 
(44) -NEG8Cx) = poslf..x) - { dlf..x) } 
(45) -poslf..x) = NEG8Cx) - { dlf..x) }  
Returning to (43) ,  if POslf..a) ::::> poslf..b), then pos8Ca) - { dlf..a) } ::::> POs8Cb) - { d8Cb) } ,  
s ince d 8( a )  and d 8( b )  are the maximal elements o f  pos 8( a )  and pos 8( b ) , 
respectively. It follows that -NEG8Ca) ::::> -NEG8Cb), by substitution, and finally that 
NEGlf..b) ::::> NEGlf..a) ,  by contraposition. The other direction of the biconditional can 
be proved in the same way . 
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5. C ross-Polar Anomaly Explained 
We are now in a position to see how the algebra of extents and the sortal 
characterization of adjectival polarity supports an explanation of  cross-polar 
anomaly.  A consequence of the semantic analysis of comparatives presented in 
section 4 is that the polarity of the adjective in the comparative clause determines the 
sortal value of the extent variable that the comparative quantifies over. To see why, 
consider the logical representation of the comparative, repeated in (46). 
(46) 3e [e :::> ee] [qJ(x, e)] 
When the extent introduced by the comparative clause ( ee) is  positive , i t  is  an 
interval that ranges from the lower end of the scale to some point. In order for a 
proper inclusion rehltion to hold between e and ee, e must also include the lower 
end of the scale, therefore e must also be positive. When ee is  negative, it ranges 
from the upper end of the scale to some point .  It follows that in order for e to 
properly include ee, it also must be negative, since it must include the upper end of 
the scale. The result is that a comparative restricts the possible value of the extent 
variable it binds to be an extent of the same sort as that selected by the adjective in 
the comparative clause. This entails that whenever the adjective in the comparative 
clause is of opposite polarity from the adjective in the main clause, the comparative 
restricts the extent argument of the main adjective to be an extent of the wrong sort. 
This sortal mismatch is the cause of cross-polar anomaly . 
For illustration of the analysis, consider sentences ( 1 )  and (2) .  The logical 
form of ( 1 ) , in which the adjective in the main clause is negative and the adjective in 
the comparative clause is positive, is (47) .  
( I ) #Mike is shorter than Carmen is tall . 
(47) 3e[e :::> te ' .tall(Carmen,e ')] [short(Mike, e)] 
The comparative restricts the possible value of the extent argument of short to be an 
extent which properly includes the extent to which Mike is tal l .  Only positive 
extents satisfy the restriction, therefore the comparative restricts the extent argument 
of the negative adjective short to be a positive extent, triggering sortal anomaly. 
The anomaly of (2) ,  in which the adjectives are reversed, is explained in 
exactly the same way. (2) has the logical representation in (48) . 
(2) #The Brothers Karamazov is longer than The Idiot is short. 
(48) 3e[e :::> te '.short(ldiot,e ') ] [long(BK, e)] 
According to (48) ,  (2) is true iff for some extent e that properly includes the extent 
to which The Idiot is short, The Brothers K is at least as short as e. Only negative 
extents satisfy the restriction imposed by the comparative, so the extent argument of 
long is constrained to be a negative extent, again resulting in sortal anomaly. 
The basic form of this explanation is the same as the one I rejected in my 
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earlier discussion of the degree approach in section 3: sentences like ( 1  )- (5)  are 
anomalous because positive and negative adjectives are incommensurable. This 
type of analysis is available in the extent approach because the algebra of extents 
and the characterization adjectival polarity presented in section 4 makes a basic , 
structural distinction between positive and negative extents: positive and negative 
extents, unlike positive and negative degrees,  are different sorts of objects .  As a 
result, when a comparative restricts the argument of the adjective it modifies to be 
an extent of the wrong polarity, it triggers a sortal anomaly. It should be noted that 
this "polar incommensurability " is different in an important way from the 
"dimensional incommensurabi l i ty " discussed in section 3, which involved 
adjectives on different scales (see (26) and (27)) .  Whereas the latter is triggered 
when a gradable adjective is supplied with an extent argument from an incompatible 
scale, the former arises when an adjective is supplied with an extent on the correct 
scale, but not "of the right shape" .  
An interesting consequence o f  this analysis i s  that cross-polar anomaly 
forms a natural class with another well known class of anomalous sentences :  
examples in which a negative adjective is associated with a measure phrase, as  in 
(49) (see Hale 1 970 for early discussion of this phenomenon).  
(49) #The Dream of a Ridiculous Man is 2 1  pages short. 
The explanation for the anomaly of (49), which is roughly the same as the one 
suggested in von Stechow 1984b, runs as follows. Positive extents on a scale with 
a zero point-which is  the type of scale I assume to be associated with dimensional 
adjectives like long and short-are bounded. In contrast, negative extents are always 
unbounded, since a scale has no maximal element. Assuming that measure phrases 
like 21 pages , 2 meters , and so on, denote bounded extents, the measure phrase in 
a sentence l ike (49) provides the wrong sort of argument for the negative adjective 
short. The end result is that (49), like cross-polar anomaly,  is an example of "polar 
incommensurability" . 
6. Positives That Look Like Negatives 
In the remaining sections of this paper, I will take a quick look at two sets of facts 
which, on the surface,  appear to be counterexamples to the claim that comparatives 
constructed out of positive and negative pairs of adjectives are anomalous.  The first 
set of facts, brought to my attention by Chris Barker (personal communication) ,  is  
illustrated by the sentences in (50)-(52) .  
(50) Your C is sharper than your D is flat. 
(5 1 )  My watch i s  faster than your watch is slow. 
(52) She was earlier than I was late . 
These sentences are clearly not anomalous, but there is good reason to believe that 
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this is not because the analysis developed in the previous section is i ncorrect .  
Instead, despite initial appearances ,  all of the adjectives in (50)-(52) are positive. 
Three pieces of evidence support this conclusion. 
First, all of the adjectives in  (50)-(52) can take measure phrases ;  as 
observed in section 5,  this is a characteristic of positive adjectives , not negatives. 
(53) Your C is 30 Hz flat/sharp. 
(54) My watch is 10 minutes fast/slow. 
(55) She was an hour earlyllate . 
Second, (50)-(52) are non-anomalous only on a very specific interpretation : one in 
which the extents i nvolved in the interpretations of the adject ives  measure 
divergence from some common point of reference, rather than the " absolute " 
projection of an object on a scale. For example, (50) compares the extents two 
which two notes differ from their respective "pure tones " ,  and (5 1 )  compares the 
extents to which our watches deviate from "on time" .  When absolute extents are 
compared, as in typical cases of cross-polar anomaly, the adjectives in  (50)-(52) 
trigger cross-polar anomaly.  This is shown by the minimal pair (5 1 )  and (56) .  
(56) #My car is faster than your car is slow. 
Final ly ,  when the adjectives in  (50)-(52) are interpreted in as described above, 
statements that appear to be substitution instances of (43) are not val id .  (57) ,  for 
example, is false when your C is sharper than your D, but neither is flat. 
(57) Your C is sharper than your D iff your D is flatter than your C. 
If the adjectives i n  (50)-(52) are sortally positive, as these facts suggest ,  
then they do not represent counterexamples to the analysis of cross-polar anomaly 
proposed in the previous section . An important questi.on that remains to be 
answered, however, i s  how these adjectives come to have the interpretations they 
do-how i s  it, for example, that fast and slow can either have canonical polar 
interpretations, as in (56), or the"measuring from a reference point" interpretation in 
(5 1 ) ?  This is a question that should be a point of future work, but I will not attempt 
to answer it  here . 
7. Comparison of Deviation 
The second set of facts that appear to be counterexamples to the generalization that 
comparatives constructed out of antonymous adjectives are anomalous is  exempli­
fied by the equatives (58) and (59) and the paratactic comparatives (60) and (6 1 ) . 
(58) Shawn is  as tall as Mugsy i s  short . 
(59) The Tenderloin is as dirty as Pacific Heights is clean . 
25 1 
252 CHRISTOPHER KENNEDY 
(60) A Fiat is more dangerous than a Volvo is safe. 
(6 1 )  San Francisco Bay i s  more shallow than Monterey Bay i s  deep. 
These sentences, which I will refer to as "comparison of deviation" constructions, 
have three characteristics that distinguish them from standard comparatives. 
First, comparison of deviation constructions compare the relative extents to 
which two objects deviate from some standard value associated with the adjective. 
This is illustrated by (62), which accurately paraphrases the meaning of (58) .  
(62) The extent to which Shawn exceeds a standard of tallness is at least as great 
as the extent to which Mugsy exceeds a standard of shortness. 
In contrast, standard comparatives and equatives compare the "absolute" projections 
of two objects on a scale . A sentence l ike (63), has the paraphrase in (64). 
(63) Shawn's feet are as wide as Mugsy's feet are long. 
(64) The extent to which Shawn's feet are wide is at least as great as the extent to 
which Mugsy's feet are long . 
Second, unlike typical comparatives, comparison of deviation constructions entail 
that the properties predicated of the compared objects are true in the absolute sense . 
For example, (65) is contradictory, but (66) is not. 
(65) San Francisco Bay is more shallow than Monterey Bay is  deep, but it 's still 
quite deep. 
(66) San Francisco Bay is shallower than Monterey Bay, but it's still quite deep. 
Finally ,  comparison of deviation constructions are morphologically dis-tinguished 
from typical comparatives in not licensing incorporation of the adj ective and 
comparative morpheme, as shown by the contrasts between (6 1 )  and (67) . 1 1  
(67) #San Francisco Bay is shallower than Monterey Bay is deep.  
These characteristics suggest that despite their superficial s imi larity to 
sentences which show cross-polar anomaly,  comparison of deviation constructions 
are semantically-and possibly syntactically-distinct, and so not counterexamples to 
the analysis developed in section 5. In support of this claim, it should be noted that 
a sentence l ike (58) cannot mean that Shawn and Mugsy are equal in height. This is 
a positive result ,  because this is exactly the kind of interpretation that the 
explanation of cross-polar anomaly proposed here rules out. The " standard" logical 
representation of (58) is (68), which is true just in case there is an extent e such that 
e includes the extent to which Mugsy is short, and Shawn is at least as tall as e. 
(68) 3e [e ;;;2 le '.short(Mugsy,e �] [tall(Shawn, e)] 
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The interpretation of (58) indicated by (68) is impossible because it triggers cross­
polar anomaly: the equative restricts the extent argument of the adjective in the main 
clause to be an extent of the wrong sort. 
The question that remains to be answered, though, is j ust how is the 
comparison of deviation interpretation of (58) (as well as (59)-(6 1 )) derived? Space 
prohibits a fully detailed analysis of this phenomenon here , so I wil l  restrict myself 
to an general overview (see Kennedy 1 997 for a detailed analysis of comparison of 
deviat ion ) .  The explanation builds on the in terpretation of "d i fferential 
comparat ives" l ike (69)-(70) (see Hellan 1 98 1  and von S techow 1 984a for 
discussion of differential comparatives) .  
(69) The Brothers Karamazov is 1 22 pages longer than The Idiot. 
(70) Mike i s  12 cm shorter than Carmen. 
The interesting aspect of these constructions is the i nterpretation of the measure 
phrases .  In (69) and (70), 122 pages and 1 2  cm denote "differential extents " :  
extents that describe the difference between the projections o f  the compared objects 
on a scale. 
What I would l ike to suggest is that comparison of deviation constructions 
involve quantification over such differential extents, rather than over the actual 
extent argument of a gradable predicate , as in standard comparatives. More 
specifically, comparison of deviation involves quantification over a differential 
extent that denotes the difference between the absolute projection of an object and a 
contextually determined standard value . If this analysis is correct, then assuming 
an operation of extent concatenation as defi ned in (7 1 )  (see von Stechow 1 984b, 
B ierwisch 1 989;  see also Hellan 1 98 1 ,  von Stechow 1 984a, and Klein 1 99 1  for 
concatenation of degrees), the logical representation of a sentence l ike (58) can be 
formalized as in (72) : to paraphrase, (58) is true just in case for some extent e such 
that e is at least as great as the extent to which Mugsy exceeds a standard of 
shortness, Shawn exceeds a standard of tallness by e . 
(7 1 )  eJ oe2 = Ie[e - e2 = e J ] .  
(72) 3e [e :=1 te ' .short(Mugsy,e 'oes(shorrj) ] [tall(Shawn, eoes(tall)) ] 
This analysis accurately captures the meaning of this sentence, and it also accounts 
for i ts entailments : s ince a sentence of the form x is cp is true just in case the extent 
to which x is  cp is at least as great as the standard for cp, the truth conditions for the 
absolute are satisfied whenever the truth conditions for the comparison of deviation 
interpretation are satisfied. 
More importantly,  if this analysis is correct ,  then it explains why 
compari son of deviation does not trigger cross-polar anomaly .  S imply put, 
d ifferential extents are sortally the same regardless of the sortal value of the extent 
with which they are concatenated. Empirically, this is shown by the fact that 
differential measure phrases occur with both positive and negative comparatives, as 
i l lustrated by (70). More generally, this fol lows from the algebra of extents :  in  
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order for the concatenation of a differential extent with a positive or negative extent 
to be an interval that satisfies the definition of extent (a convex proper subset of a 
scale; see the discussion in section 4) , the differential extent must be bounded. 
Assuming that all bounded extents are sortally the same (see the discussion of (49) 
above), if comparison of deviation involves quantification over differential extents, 
i t  should not trigger cross-polar anomaly . What remains ,  of course, i s  to show 
exactly how comparison of deviation interpretations are compositionally derived. 
8. Conclusion 
Using the phenomenon of cross-polar anomaly as an empirical basis for the 
argumentation, this paper has made three primary claims. First, the interpretation 
of gradable adjectives should be formalized in terms of extents ,  or intervals on a 
scale, rather than degrees (points on a scale) .  Second, two sorts of extents should 
be distinguished-positive extents and negative extents-in such a way that they 
provide complementary perspectives on the projection of an object on a scale , as 
argued in Seuren 1 978 ,  1 984, von S techow 1 984b, and Lobner 1 990. Third, 
adjectival polarity should be characterized as a sortal distinction: positive adjectives 
denote relations between individuals and positive extents; negative adjectives denote 
relations between individuals and negative extents . This set of assumptions 
supports a general semantic analysis of positive and negative gradable adjectives in 
both the comparative and absolute forms, and also explains  the validity of 
statements like (42) .  Most importantly, it provides a principled explanation of 
cross-polar anomaly as a type of sortal anomaly. 
Endnotes 
*1 am grateful  to Chris Albert, Chris Barker, Donka Farkas, and Bill Ladusaw for 
extremely valuable discussion of the material presented here and for comments on 
earlier drafts. Errors or inconsistencies are my responsibility. 
1 .  The anomaly of sentences l ike ( l  )-(5)  was first observed by Hale 1 970. See 
Bierwisch 1 989 for discussion of similar facts in German. 
2. The importance of the "dimensional parameter" is that it provides a means of 
differentiating one scale from another, and by extension, a means of distinguishing 
e .g .  measurements of tallness from measurements ofJastness. 
3 .  A different type of analysis with the general framework of scalar approaches, in 
which adjectives are analyzed as measure functions-functions from objects to scalar 
values-is developed in Wunderlich 1 970, Bartsch and Vennemann 1 972 ,  and 
Kennedy 1 997.  
4. Intuitively, a standard-denoting degree is  a degree that identifies a point on a 
scale that supports a partitioning of those objects in the domain of a gradable 
adjective cp for which the statement x is cp is true, from those objects for which x is 
cp is false, in some context (cf. Klein 1 980) . In the discussion that follows, I will 
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leave open the question of how exactly the standard value is identified, and simply 
assume (following B ierwisch 1 989) that it i s  determined contextually, relative to 
some subset of the domain of the gradable adjective determined to be relevant ( i .e . ,  
a comparison class ;  cf. the non-scalar approaches to the semantics of gradable 
adjectives in  McConnel l-Ginet 1 973, Kamp 1 975 ,  Klein 1 980, Larson 1 988) .  
5 .  Although many scalar analyses of comparatives are stated in terms of existential 
quantification over degrees, some analyze comparatives as universal quantification 
structures (Cresswell 1 976 ;  cf. Postal 1 974, Williams 1 977) or as generalized 
quantifiers (Moltmann 1 992 ,  Hendriks 1 995) .  I focus here on an existential 
quantification analysis for perspicuity, but the problem of cross-polar anomaly that 
I will introduce below holds for all accounts in which degrees are analyzed as 
points on a scale. See Kennedy 1 997 for discussion. 
6. For simplicity, I assume here that the comparative clause is a definite description 
of a maximal degree (see Russell 1 905, Postal 1 974, Williams 1 977,  Hellan 1 98 1 ,  
von S techow 1 984a, Rullmann 1 995, Kennedy 1 997) .  However, the problem 
presented by cross-polar anomaly for a degree-based analysis of gradable adjectives 
and comparatives extends to analysis in which the comparative clause is analyzed as 
a universal quantification structure, as in Cresswell 1 976, Lerner & Pinkal 1 992, 
Moltmann 1 992, and Gawron 1 995, as wil l  be made clear in section 3 .  
7 .  To be precise, this sortal anomaly ari ses because the partial ordering relation 
associated with the absolute construction is undefined since its arguments ( the 
degree introduced by the comparative and the projection of the subject on a scale of 
"tragedy" )  come from different scales. 
8 .  Bierwisch ( 1 989) also constructs an algebra in which degrees are formalized as 
intervals on a scale, but this algebra does not include analogs to negative extents 
(see the discussion below) .  Although I do not have space to go through 
B ierwisch's proposals i n  detail here, it should be noted that h is  assumptions 
provide a means of ruling out examples of cross-polar anomaly in which the 
adjective in  the comparative clause is negative as semantically anomalous .  
Sentences in  which the adjective in the comparative clause is  positive are not  
semantically anomalous ,  however, but  are instead predicted to be contradictory , 
suggesting that there should be an observable difference between e .g .  ( 1 )  and (2) .  
Such a difference does not appear to exist. 
9. I assume that dimensional adjectives like long and tall are associated with scales 
which have minimal elements, though we may not want to make this assumption 
for adjectives like beautiful or interesting; see Bierwisch 1 989 for discussion. 
1 0. In effect, the structural distinction between positive and negative extents 
derives the relational difference between positive and negative adjectives. See 
Kennedy 1 996, 1 997 for additional discussion of this point, and discussion of how 
the algebra of extents derives the monotonicity properties of gradable adjectives (cf. 
Seuren 1 978 ,  Sanchez-Valencia 1 994) . 
1 1 .  I won't have anything to say about these facts here, though they suggest that 
comparison of deviation constructions are syntactically distinct from standard 
comparati ves. 
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